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-SEVERANCE TAXES
AS AN ISSUE OF ENERGY SECTIONALISM
John S. Lowe*
A.

Introduction

The energy crisis that began in the mid-1970s exacerbated a long standing
conflict between the energy producing states and the energy consuming states.
"Freeze a Yankee" jeered the energy producers! In turn, the inhabitants of the
producing states were labeled "blue eyed Arabs" by many consumers.
The sectionalist conflict itself dates back at least to the enactment of the
percentage depletion allowance and the intangible drilling cost deductions for oil
and gas wells in the first half of the century These tax benefits generally have been
supported by both the populations and congressional representatives of producing
states as essential elements of a strong oil industry, and a strong oil industry as a key
to a strong national economy. On the other hand, the consuming states have tended
to view both percentage depletion and the intangible drilling cost deduction as
unnecessary subsidies to the oil industry that increase the tax burden their citizens
must bear. The balance of power between the groups has shifted back and forth over
time, and the debate has often been acrimonious.2
The historic tension between the producing and consuming states over energy
matters was worsened by the rapid escalation of energy prices in the 1970s and early
1980s. As prices and production soared, the economies of the major producing
states boomed? In contrast, the major consuming states found themselves mired in
7 *B.A. with highest honors, Denison 1963; LL.B., Harvard, 1966. Professor of Law and Associate
Director of the National Energy Law and Policy Institute, The University of Tulsa. This paper is
developed from ajoint study of Energy Sectionalism conducted from 1982 to 1984 by the American
Bar Association Coordinating Group on Energy Law and the National Energy Law and Policy Institute
of The University of Tulsa. Thanks are due to the members of the Committee and to the staff of the
study, particularly the Honorable Carol Dinkins, Professor Gary D. Allison, James L. Mitchell, Esq.,
Robert B. Krueger, Esq. and Nancy C. Dodson, Esq. Copyright American Bar Association
Coordinating Group on Energy Law and the National Energy Law and Policy Institute, 1984.
'The percentage depletion allowance was created by the Revenue Act of 1932, § 1 14(b)(3), 47 Stat.
169 (1932). The intangible drilling cost deduction was enacted into law by § 263 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954. However its existence as a Treasury regulation dates back to February 8, 1917,
in Treasury Decision 2447, issued in connection with the Revenue Act of 1916.
21 n 1975, the consuming states succeeded in virtually eliminating percentage depletion because of
the robust state of the oil and gas industry. I.R.C. § 613A, added by the Tax Reduction Act of 1975,
Publ. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 47 (1975).
3
See generally the analysis at Miernyk, "The Differential Effects of Rising Energy Prices or
Regional Income and Employment:' in H. Landsberg, High Energy Costs: Assessing the Burden.
(Resources for the Future, Inc. 1980). For a discussion of the likely long-range impacts of high energy
prices upon producing and consuming states, see Miernyk, "Regional Economic Consequences of High
Energy Prices in the United States," 1J. ofEnergy andDevelopment 213 (1976), and Miernyk, "Regional
Employment and Impacts of Rising Energy Prices:' 26 Labor LawJ 518 (1975). Of course, the major
energy producing states in the Sun Belt have had other economic advantages in addition to rising
energy prices. Furthermore, the relative advantages of the energy producing states have been
substantially and adversely affected by the downturn in oil and gas prices, as is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 165-171.
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the most severe economic recession since the Great Depression, in part because of
high energy prices.
The relative strengths and weaknesses of the states' economies were reflected in
their finances. While many consuming states enjoyed only modest revenue increases
in the inflationary 70's, the revenues of producing states shot up. For example,
personal income tax collections in Oklahoma increased by 270 percent from 1972 to
1980, while comparable collections were up only 163 percent in Michigan,
150 percent in Massachusetts, and 129 percent in Pennsylvania.5 Corporate tax
collections in Oklahoma increased by 221 percent over the same period, but by only
122 percent in Massachusetts, 74 percent in Pennsylvania, and a mere 22 percent in
Michigan. Sales tax receipts increased by 207 percent and 334 percent in Texas and
Wyoming from 1972 to 1980, but by only 73 percent in Michigan and 94 percent in
Ohio. Bonuses, rents and royalties for leases of state-owned lands by Alaska,
California, Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas and
Wyoming more than doubled just from fiscal year 1979 to fiscal year 1981.7
Distributions to the states by the federal government from federal leasing proceeds
increased approximately 50 percent just from 1979 to 1980.8
Perhaps the clearest example of how producing states have benefited from
rising energy prices is severance tax revenues. Total severance tax collections in
Fiscal Year 1981 were 124 percent greater than in Fiscal Year 1979 and 770 percent
greater than in Fiscal Year 1971. In 1981, eight states obtained 20 percent or more of

'The State of Alaska's revenues increased so much that the legislature tried to rebate a portion of
them to its residents. In 1969, thatstate had a budget of only $124 million. By 1981, its oil revenues
totaled $3.7 billion for a popoulation of only approximately 270,000. A statutory dividend distribution
scheme that favored long time residents was struck down by the Supreme Court on Equal Protection
grounds in Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 102 S. Ct. 2309 (1982).
5
Statistics developed from COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, The Book of the States, 1982-1983,
Table 3, p. 378 and COUNCILOF STATEGOVERNMENTS,TTheBook ofthe States, 1972-1973, Table 3, p. 206.
6

1d.

7

Staff Study, Advisory Commission On Intergovernmental Relations, "State Taxation of Energy
Resources," Table 19, 3-30 (Information Paper, Preliminary Copy, January, 1983).
8
id, Table 22, at 3-36.
5
id, at 3-7.
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10
their total tax collections from energy-related severance taxes. A staff study by the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Affairs indicates that rapid growth in
severance tax collections, both in real terms and in relation to other revenue sources
1
of the primary producing states, will continue.'
Declining or flat prices for oil and gas such as those that prevailed in 1982, 1983
and 1984 will lessen the advantage of the energy producing states. In fact, several
states whose reliance upon severance tax income has been heaviest now face budget
crises.' 2 However, the prospect for the long term is that the primary energy
producing states will continue to have a substantial economic advantage over the
major energy consuming states, and that advantage will be in part due to their ability
to subject energy resources to severance taxation. A variety of concerns about this
probability have been articulated. An excellent summary is provided by a staff study
of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations:

I. Fiscal Disparities. Energy revenues might result in unacceptably large disparities
among states in their ability to finance public services.... While fiscal equalization is
only of secondary importance in the American federal system, a finding of major
new disparities in fiscal capacity could lead to a rethinking of the need for equalizing
policies.
2. Unfair Competition. The fiscal advantage accruing to producer states might be so
large as to result in a distortion in the allocation of economic resources among states
and regions. Such an effect might be expected if, for example, energy capacity
allows a state to significantly improve its public services and/or offer tax relief to its
residents and businesses. This assumes of course that location choices can be
affected by fiscal variables.
10

The following table summarizes the importance of severance taxes to several states:

State

1979

Severance tax as
% of state tax
revenues
1980

18
Texas ..................
21
Alaska .................
21
Louisiana ..............
19
Oklahoma .............
19
New Mexico ...........
7
Kentucky ..............
2
Florida ................
25
Wyoming ..............
8
North Dakota ..........
2
Michigan ..............
14
Montana ...............
3
Mississippi .............
Source: WORLD OIL, June 1983, p.

23
35
22
25
23
8
3
27
12
3
22
4
207.

1981

Severance tax
1981 revenue
(Million $)

%
revenue
increase
1980-81

27
50
29
27
27
0
3
29
23
3
21
6

2,197
1,170
815
601
323
194
169
138
103
99
99
88

44
131
55
38
51
10
40
30
134
19
4
66

"Staff Study, supra note 7 at 3-10 to 3-15.
12Oklahoma is an example. Oil and gas severance tax revenues rose from $135 million in 1979 to
$322 million in 1981 and $415 million in 1982. When revenues in 1983 decreased to $399 million, with
the expectation of further declines, the state was thrown into a major financial crisis. Forest Lowery,
Channel 6 Eyewitness News, 30 Minutes, December 3, 1983. In the spring of 1984, the Oklahoma
Legislature adopted a variety of new taxes to cope with the problem.
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3. Tax Exporting. Energy capacity may allow a state to export a disproportionate share
of its tax burden to non-residents. The distribution of tax burdens which results
when some states export their tax burden may be considered unfair and may result
in retaliatory actions by other states attempting to protect their own citizens'
interests. Furthermore, tax exporting weakens the link within a state between
public sector benefits and burdens, thereby potentially reducing political
accountability and possibly contributing to an excessive expansion of the state-local
public sector in some states.
4. Conflict with NationalEnergy Policy. Energy is so important to the functioning of the
economy that national security requires a lessening of dependence on foreign
energy supplies. State tax practices might be obstructing the achievement of this
goal by discouraging investment in domestic energy production or by encouraging
inefficient production patterns.
5. Equitable Distribution of "Economic Rents." The combination of OPEC cartel power
and federal policy allowing domestic prices to rise to world market levels has
resulted in large "economic rents" or "windfall gains" accruing to domestic energy
producers and the governments which can tax them. It may be argued that the
current allocation of rents is unfair in that too small a share is going to the federal
government which represents all of the consumers who must bear the burden of
13
higher prices.

Because of concerns sudh as these, state severance taxes became a focal point of
sectionalist debate. But are these threats real? And can such pressures be
accommodated comfortably within the federal system? This paper will review what
has happened and provide an assessment.
B.

Background of Conflict over Severance Taxes
A severance tax may be defined as:
a levy assessed at flat or graduated rates by government on the privilege, process, or act of
commercially severing or extracting natural resources from the soil or water and measured
14
by the amount of the gross or the net value of the natural resources produced or sold.

Severance taxes are called by a variety of names, including production taxes,
license fees and conservation taxes. They come in two basic forms; unit and
ad valorem. A unit severance tax is based upon the amount of the resource
produced; e.g., $.65 per ton of coal. An ad valorem severance tax is based upon the
value of the production; e.g., seven percent of the market value at the wellhead of
natural gas produced and saved. However, unit and ad valorem severance taxes are
alike in that they are applied before the resource enters into interstate commerce,
triggered by removal of the taxed resource from the ground. They are an excise tax
upon the privilege of removing resources from the ground.
Two rationales are advanced to support the imposition of severance taxes. One
is that mining or resource production imposes burdens upon the host community
1

3Staff Study, supra note 7 at 1-9.
"4Lockner, "The Effect of the Severance Tax on the Decisions of the Mining Firm,' 4Nat. Resources
L.J. 468, 469 (1965).
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for which it should be compensated. 15 By this view, severance taxes are necessary to
repay the levying jurisdiction for damage to its infrastructure, environment,
lifestyle and heritage caused by extraction of natural resources. While few argue
against this rationale as a guiding principle, many disagreements surface when
attempts are made to relate amounts collected in severance taxes to specific
damages. The damage to the state and its people is often indirect and hard to value.
A second rationale supporting imposition of severance taxes is the need of the
state for revenues to pay for public services, quite apart from those provided to the
severing industry. 6 Severance taxes are particularly attractive as devices for fund
raising because natural resources are relatively immobile. Imposition of a severance
tax on production of coal or oil and gas is less likely to result in a movement of
business activity from the state than an increase in the general corporate or
individual income taxes, in part because businessmen cannot take the resources with
them. More important, to the extent that natural resources produced are used
outside of the state, it is possible that a substantial proportion of the burden of
severance taxes can be exported to the ultimate consumers. If the burden can be
exported then the exporting state enjoys two benefits.'7 First, the price of public
goods is effectively reduced, which gives the tax exporting state a competitive
advantage over its sister states and may lead to relocation of industry. Second, the
real income of citizens of the tax-exporting state is increased because they can buy a
larger bundle of public and private goods with a given personal income. 8 The effect
of tax exportation upon real income is accentuated by federal grant formulae that
make "tax effort;' the ratio of personal income to tax burden, an important factor in
alloting federal funds. To the extent that a state's taxes are exported, the real
personal income of its citizens is understated and its tax effort is overstated.
C. The judicialResponse to Conflict over Severance Taxes
1. The Montana Coal Case: Theory Put to the Test
Theory is neutral. Conflict comes from its application. No severance tax has
aroused more heated debate in recent years than the Montana coal severance tax.
Both a desire to compensate the state for the burdens imposed on it by coal
development and the need to raise additional general revenues were probably
motivating factors in increasing the tax in 1975, when the Montana Legislature

"Staff Study, supra note 7 at 3-2.
6

d.
"7Parker, "State Severance Taxes from Mineral Extraction on Federal Lands:' 12 (Congressional
Research Service, Library of Congress, Main File Typed Report, Sept. 21, 1982).
181d.
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raised the state's ad valorem severance tax to a maximum of 30 percent.' 9 Value was
defined as the price for which coal is sold after extraction and preparation for
shipment, f.o.b. at the mine, less production taxes.' ° The effective rate of the tax,
about 22 percent in 1979,21 was substantially higher than any other coal severance
tax then in effect. Half of the proceeds from the tax are paid into a permanent trust
fund to pay future and unforeseen social and environmental costs of coal
22

stripping.

The stated reason of the State of Montana for the tax increase and the trust
fund was that they were necessary to compensate it for loss of its natural resources:
"Montana's experience had shown thatits mineral wealth could be exhausted and exported
with little left in Montana to make up the loss of its irreplaceable resources. Montana has
been painfully educated about the extreme economicjolts that follow when the mine runs
out, the oil depletes, or the timber saws come still. We have a good many examples that
teach us what happens to our hills when the riches of our Treasure State are spent. For
these and other reasons, when strip coal mining was beginning to burgeon, in 1975, the
legislature moved to fix a tax that would provide both for the present and the future when
23
the coal deposits were gone."

Others saw the tax increase differently:
[Cloal which was taxed at a rate of 34 cents per ton, is now being taxed at a rate of over $2 per
ton - an effective increase of over 600%.

What, we ask, could justify such an inordinate tax increase? It couldn't be need.., the states
impose a variety of other taxes on coal production and related activity to cover impacts...
Montana made no attempt to tailor the tax to meet legitimate needs. This was a tax increase
justified only by opportunity. Montana knew that there would be an increasing and serious
need for coal as a result of the newly developing national energy policy. It knew that a
9

Mont. Code Ann. § 15-35-101 to 15-35-107 (1979). Essentially the statute provided for taxation
under the following scheme:
Heating Quality
(BTU per pound of coal):

Surface
Mining

Underground
Mining

Under 7,000

12 cents or
20% of value

5 cents or
3% of value

7000

-

8000

22 cents or
30% of value

8 cents or
4% of value

8000

-

9000

34 cents or
30% of value

10 cents or
4% of value

The formula requires that the higher tax figure be used at each stage.
2

§ 15-35-102(1) (1979).
note 7 at 3-7.
The fund was established through an amendment to the Montana Constitution. See MONIT
CONSTr. art. IX, § 5. Distribution of tax revenues to the fund is provided for in MONT. CODE AxN.
§ 15-35-108 (1979).
23
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. State, 615 P.2d 847, 850 (Mont. 1980). See also "Fiscal Disparities:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs;" 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1981) (Testimony of Senator John Melcher).
°MONT. CODE ANN.
21
Staff Study, supra
22
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number of midwestern and southern utility companies had entered into long-term
contracts to purchase large quantities of Montana coal over the next twenty or so years. It
knew that there were pass-through clauses in these coal contracts which would pass the
burden of the tax on to consumers in its sister states. Montana sought to capitalize on this
4
opportunity and fixed the rate of the tax at what it thought the market would bear

The dispute quickly moved to the courts. Four coal producers paid the tax
under protest. Along with 11 out-of-state utilities, they filed suit in state court against
Montana. They sought refund of all taxes paid under protest, an injunction against
further collection of the tax, and a declaration that the tax was invalid under the
Commerce and Supremacy Clauses2 5 of the U.S. Constitution.
26
The trial court dismissed the suit and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that: (1) the tax was not subject to scrutiny under the Commerce Clause
because the severance of coal was a "local" event preceding entry of the coal into
interstate commerce; 27 (2) even if the tax were subject to such scrutiny, it was valid
because it met constitutional requirements; 28 and (3) the severance tax was not
unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause because it did not conflict with any
federal law or policy.2 9
Predictably, CommonwealthEdison Co. v. State was appealed to the United States
Supreme Court a The appeal presented the Court with a difficult line to draw
between clear precedent and current theory. The Montana Supreme Court had
held the Montana severance tax not subject to scrutiny under the Commerce Clause
on the authority ofHeislerv. Thomas Colliery Co. 3 1 Under the reasoning ofHeisler,the
validity of a state tax was determined by whether the tax was levied upon goods
before or after their entry into interstate commerce. By this reasoning, the
distinction between intrastate and interstate commerce was crucial. The Commerce
Clause was thought to invalidate any direct state taxation of interstate commerce and
to permit any tax levied in intrastate commerce.
However, though Heisler had never been overruled, the United States Supreme
Court had moved away from the theory that state taxes on interstate commerce were
invalid, while those on intrastate commerce wereper se valid. Instead, the Court had
focused upon "the practical effect of a challenged tax '3 2 because it recognized that
state taxes on a local activity may affect interstate commerce so significantly that
24

"Hearings on S. 2695 Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources;' 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 249-50 (1980) (Statement of William P. Rogers), quoted in Gray, "Coal Severance Taxes:
Outbreak of the Domestic Energy War?:' XIV Nat. Resources Law. 741 (1982).
25
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 2 and U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl.2.
26
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. State, supra note 23.
27
1d. at 854.
2
S1d. at 855.
29
1n so ruling the Montana Supreme Court considered the following statutes: Powerplant and
Industrial Fuel Use Act, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (1978), Natural Gas Policy Act, Pub. L. No.
95-621,92 Stat. 3351 (1978), Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act, Pub. L. No.
93-577, 88 Stat. 1878 (1974), Energy Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (1974),
Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act, Pub. L. No. 93-319,88 Stat. 246 (1974), Energy
Petroleum Allocation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627 (1973), and Clean Air Amendments of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
3
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Mgntana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
3
Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922).
"2Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 443 (1980).
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Commerce Clause scrutiny is appropriate, 33 and that "a State has a significant
interest in exacting from interstate commerce its fair share of the cost of state
government' 34 In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, the Court had held that a state
tax affecting interstate commerce does not violate the Commerce Clause if it (1) "is
applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, (2) fairly
apportioned, (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) is fairly
35
related to the services provided by the state.
Argument to the Supreme Court focused upon whether the mechanical
approach ofHeisler should be overruled and, if so, whether the Complete Auto Transit
test was satisfied by the Montana tax. The severance tax unarguably satisfied the first
and second prongs of the Complete Auto Transit test because the only nexus of the
severance of the coal was in Montana, and apportionment was not an issue, since no
other state could levy a severance tax on Montana coal. 3 6 Therefore, only the third
and fourth prongs, whether the tax discriminated against interstate commerce and
was fairly related to the services provided by the state, were argued. The appeal also
addressed the issue of whether the state tax was preempted under the Supremacy
7
Clause
The majority opinion written by Justice Marshall quickly discarded Heisler in
favor of the later practical effect tests 38 and moved to consider the validity of the tax
under the Commerce Clause. The appellants had asserted that the Montana
severance tax discriminated against interstate commerce because ninety percent of
Montana coal is shipped to other states under contracts that permit severance taxes
to be passed through.39 As a result, the burden of the Montana tax is borne mainly by
non-Montana utility companies and consumers.
Previously, the Supreme Court had ruled invalid Louisiana's "First Use" tax on
natural gas, which had insulated Louisianians from its impact by a system of credits
and exclusions so that only gas moving out of the state was burdened. 0 It had also
disallowed as discriminatory attempts to ban the export of natural resources, such as
game,4 1 or natural gas,4 2 or to prevent the import of undesirable residues, such as
wastes, for disposal. 43
The Supreme Court held the Montana tax to be non-discriminatory.14 It did not
find the differential treatment that it had found in other "discrimination" cases
because the Montana tax applied both to interstate and intrastate purchasers of
Montana coal.4 5 In fact, over 60 percent of Montana's electricity consumers were
served by Montana Power Company, which burned only Montana coal in its
33

1d.
Dept. of Revenue etc. v. Ass'n of Wash. Stevedoring Co., 435 U.S. 734, 748 (1978).
35430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (numbering added).
36
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra note 30 at 617.
37
U.S. CONsT. art. IV, cl. 2.
3
"Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra note 30 at 617.
39d. at 617-18.
40Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
41Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
42Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
43City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
44Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra note 30 at 629.
4"Id. at 618.
34
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generating plants ! 6 The Court stated that the premise of its discrimination cases was
that the purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create an area of free trade among
47
the states. "In matters of foreign and interstate commerce there are no state lines."
The Court held that:
Consequently, to accept appellants' theory and invalidate the Montana tax solely because
most of Montana's coal is shipped across the very state borders that ordinarily are to be
considered irrelevant would require a significant and, in our view, unwarranted departure
from the rationale of our prior discrimination cases:

The Court also found that the severance tax complied with the fourth prong of
the Complete Auto Transit Case, the requirement that a tax be fairly related to the
services provided by the state.4 9 The appellants had argued that the Court should
permit introduction of economic data and analysis so that they could show that the
tax was out of proportion to the additional services related to coal extraction
provided by Montana5 The Court rejected the request, stating that the "fairly
related" test did not require that the amount of the tax be fairly related to the services
provided, but merely that the measure of the tax must be "reasonably related to the
extent of the contact."51 Essentially, the Court held that the judicial inquiry under
the Commerce Clause into a severance tax levied by a state should be the same as that
required by the Due Process Clause,52 which clearly does not provide a basis for
examining the relationship between the amount of a tax and the benefits provided
by the state5 3 Where a general revenue tax does not discriminate overtly against
interstate commerce, and is assessed proportionately to the taxpayer's activities
within the state, as will always be the case with a tax based on production, the state:
is free to pursueits own fiscal policies, unembarrassed by the Constitution, if by the practical
operation of a tax the state has exerted its power in relation to opportunities which it has
given, to protection which it has afforded, to benefits which it has conferred by the fact of
4
being an orderly, civilized society

A factual inquiry into the relationship between the revenues generated by a
severance tax and the costs incurred by the state in providing services to businesses is
a matterfor legislative inquiry, not for the federal courts, said the Court0 5 The only
limitation to the power of the state to decide the proper rate of tax is that:

46

Amicus Curia Brief of Environmental Defense Fund, Natural Resources Defense Council, and
Sierra Club at 5, Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. 609 (1981). (Brief in support of appellees).
4'Charles West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 225 (1911).
48
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra note 30 at 619.
491d. at 626.
"0Brief for appellants at 16, Commonwealth Edison Co., 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
5
"Comronwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra note 30 at 626.
52
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
53
A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934).
54
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,supra note 30 at 624-625, (quoting State of Wisconsin v.J.
C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940)).

-5 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra note 30 at 627.
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A taxing statute may be judicially disapproved if it is "so arbitrary as to compel the
conclusion that it does not involve an exertion of the taxing power, but constitutes, in
substance and effect, the direct exertion of a different and forbidden power, as, for
56
example, the confiscation of property."

Finally, the Court unanimously rejected the claim that the Montana tax was
preempted by federal law 7 The appellants had argued that the severance tax was
invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution because it conflicted with
one or more of several federal statutes. The thrust of their argument was that it
frustrated the purpose of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920.58 Under that Act,
economic rents attributable to the mining of coal on federal lands are to be captured
by royalty payments to the federal government, which then shares them with the
states according to a formula prescribed in the law. It was asserted that the Montana
severance tax defeated the purpose of the 1920 Act because it absorbed the
economic rents; the royalty is subject to the severance tax,59 and so the tax diminishes
the royalty.
The Court found nothing in the 1920 Act, in its legislative history, or in the
legislative history of its 1975 amendments to suggest that Congress meant to capture
all economic rents from the mining of federal coal. The Act contemplates only a "fair
return" to the public6 ° Further, the Court noted that section 32 of the 1920 Act
specifically authorized the states to levy severance taxes on federal coal with no
suggestion of any limit, and no limit was adopted when the Act was amended in
1975, though Congress was aware of the Montana tax.6
Arguments that the Montana tax was preempted by the general purposes of a
variety of other federal energy and environmental statutes also failed. The Court
found no indication of congressional intent to restrict the right of the states to levy
severance taxes. In fact, it noted in the course of its statutory review that section 601
of the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 197862 and the legislative history
supporting it impliedly sanctioned the Montana taxes. The Act provides federal
assistance to areas badly affected by increased coal or uranium mining where the
state governor certifies that the state or local government lacks the resources to meet
increased demand for services and facilities, 63 but it requires that revenues from
4
severance taxes be taken into account in the decision
Essentially, the United States Supreme Court adopted a "hands off" policy
toward state severance taxes in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana. While it
overturned its Heisler position that state severance taxes were not subject to
Commerce Clause scrutiny by the federal courts, it defined the required review so as
56

Id. at n. 17 (quoting A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, supra note 53 at 44 (1934)).
7
'
1d. at 632.
58
Mineral Lands Leasing Act, ch. 85, 431 Stat. 437 (1920) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 181
(1976 Supp. II 1979)).
59
Brief for appellants at 16, Commonwealth Edison Co., 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
60
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra note 30 at 632 (citing H.R. No. 681,94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 17-18, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1943, 1953).
"Id. at 632.
6242 U.S.C. § 8401(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
63
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra note 30 at 634-35.
4Id. at 635.
"A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, supra note 53 at 44.
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to give the states the broadest possible leeway in structuring severance taxes. A state
severance tax may not be overtly discriminatory, as it will not be if it is applied to
production consumed within the state as well as that shipped out of state. Nor may a
state severance tax be designed to exercise a "forbidden power "' 65 such as
confiscation of property under the pretext of taxing it; e.g., a 1000% severance tax
might run afoul of this limit 6 Within these broad limits, however, the states have
discretion to structure severance taxes and determine rates subject only to
congressional, not judicial, review. There is no constitutional requirement that a
severance tax be structured to impose burdens only in proportion to the benefits
conferred upon taxpayers. The only benefit to which taxpayers are constitutionally
entitled is the "'enjoyment of the privileges of living in an organized society,
established and safeguarded by the devotion of taxes to public purposes' "67
2. IndianSeverance Taxes
Less than a year after Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld a severance tax on oil and gas applied by an Indian tribe. Its opinion
extended the principles that underlay the broad discretion given the states to levy
severance taxes.
In 1976, theJicarilla Apache Tribe in Northwestern New Mexico adopted a unit
severance tax of $.05 per MMBTU on gas and $.29 per barrel of oil produced on the
reservation 8 These rates amounted to approximately 29 percent of the price for
which "old" regulated gas was sold and approximately 12.5 percent of the price for
which price-regulated oil was sold. The tax was approved by the Secretary of
Interior,69 as the tribal constitution required. Appellants, who held leases that
predated the severance tax, challenged the tax and a federal district court enjoined
its enforcement. However, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed7 0 and
certiorari was accepted by the Supreme Court.
The argument of the appellants in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe7 1 was
three-pronged. First, they asserted that the tribe's authority to tax outsiders who do
business on the reservation was implied from its right to exclude them, but since the
Jicarilla tribe had not conditioned its leases upon payment of a severance tax, the
tribe had no right to impose one in 197672 Second, they argued that the severance
66
Montana had argued that it was free to tax its coal even at a 1000 percent rate under theHeisler
principle. Justice Blackmun's dissent asserts that the decision in Commonwealth Edison Co. "implicitly
ratifies" that contention. 453 U.S. at 645. However, such a rate would probably be viewed as beyond the
pale of legitimate revenue raising. Williams, "Severance Taxes and Federalism: The Role of the
Supreme Court in Preserving a National Consumer Market for Energy Supplies' 53 Colo. L. Rev. 281
(1982). Some commentators disagree, however. One commentator has said that "States with informed
draftsmen can now make any tax rate constitutional by merely giving the tax the proper labels" Note,
"Commerce Clause Restraints on State Taxation of Energy Resources: A Suggested Framework for
Analysis. 60 Wash. U.L.Q. 425, 448 (1982).
67
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra note 30 at 629 (quoting Carmichael v. Southern
Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 522 (1937)).
68
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 136 (1982).
69
1d.
70
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (1980) (en banc).
71
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, supra note 68 at 149.
72
1d. at 137.
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tax was preempted by federal legislation because it was inconsistent with the
regulatory scheme for leasing and developing oil and gas resources on Indian lands
or with national energy policies.7 3 Finally, they insisted that the tax violated the
Commerce Clause because it discriminated against and imposed a multiple burden
4
upon interstate commerce7
Justice Marshall, again writing for the Court, rejected the first argument on two
grounds. First, Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville,75 had upheld the right of
Indians to tax as one of the sovereign powers of the tribe. CitingCommonwealthEdison
Co. v. Montana, he found "nothing exceptional in requiring petitioners to contribute
through taxes to the general costs of tribal government,"7 6 though the tribe already
collected rents and royalties under its leases. He noted, however, that the tribe's
sovereign authority to tax is subject to limitations because "the federal government
can take away this power, and the Tribe must obtain the approval of the Secretary
before any tax on nonmembers can take effect' 7 7 Second, in holding that, even if
the tribe's power to tax derives from its power to exclude outsiders, a failure to
exercise the power when a mineral lease is granted does not bar its exercise later, he
stated:
It is one thing to find that the Tribe has agreed to sell the right to use the land and take from
it valuable minerals; it is quite another to find that the Tribe has abandoned its sovereign
powers simply because it has not expressly reserved them.. .s

Marshall's opinion for the majority also rejected the preemption argument. It
found that the provisions of the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 192779 permitting the
states to levy severance taxes on production from Indian lands did not preempt the
tribes from levying their own taxes.08 It found nothing in the Indian Mineral
Leasing Act of 1938 s8 or in national energy policies inconsistent with tribal severance
taxes

82

In addition, the majority questioned whether Commerce Clause review
standards applied to Indian tribes, since the relationship between the tribes and the
states is a matter for the "political departments of government' 8 3 Further, the
majority said, it is appropriate for the courts to determine whether commerce is
unduly burdened or discriminated against only where Congress has not acted.
"When Congress has struck the balance it deems appropriate, the courts are no
longer needed....,84
Finally, the Court held that the four-pronged test of Complete Auto Transit would
7

31d. at 149-52.

741d. at 152-53.

7

'Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 477 U.S. 134 (1980).
1Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, supra note 68 at 138.
"Id. at 141.
78
d. at 146.
79
Indian Mineral leasing Act, Ch. 299, § 4, 41 Stat. 1347, (1927) (codified at 25 U.S.C. 398(c)
(1971)).
I'Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, supra note 68 at 151.
8125 U.S.C. §§ 39 6 (g) (1971).
52 Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, supra note 68 at 150.
"Id. at 153.
4
Id. at 154.
7
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be met if scrutiny were necessary 5 The appellants asserted that the severance tax
discriminated against interstate commerce because it exempted minerals sold on the
reservation8 6 The Court interpreted the ordinance to exempt only production
taken "in kind" by the Tribe, and held the exemption was not discriminatory0 because
7
it merely avoided "administrative make-work" from the Tribe taxing itself
Thus, barring congressional action to limit their powers, both the states and the
Indian tribes have broad discretion to structure and collect severance taxes. 88
Virtually any severance tax that does not overtly discriminate in favor of local citizens
and against interstate commerce and that does not amount to a confiscation will be
upheld. Thejudicial response to sectionalist conflicts over severance taxes has been
to defer to the Congress.
D. Legislative Response to Conflict over Severance Taxes
It seems apparent from the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana and Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe that any
substantial limitation upon severance tax rates must come from Congress. Because
of these cases, Congress has considered imposing a variety of limitations upon the
states' and tribes' power to impose high severance taxes. Whether action could be
sustained and whether it is likely to be forthcoming are the issues explored in this
section.
1. CongressionalPower under the Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution specifically gives Congress the
power "to regulate commerce... among the several states "'89 That power has been
interpreted very broadly in the twentieth century. Any activity that has a "substantial
economic effect" may be regulatedP ° Such diverse activities as child labor,
prostitution, sales of food and drugs, and strip mine reclamation have been held to
have substantial economic effect upon interstate commerce and to be subject to
regulation under the Commerce Clause. A variety of energy taxes and subsidies,
including the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax, energy tax credits, and regulation of
the price of natural gas have been enacted on the basis of "substantial economic
effect:' Where interstate commerce is substantially affected, the Commerce Clause
gives Congress virtually unlimited power which is circumscribed only by internal
limitations inherent to the political system and by the external limitations imposed by
the Constitution t
Internal limitations upon legislative initiative under the Commerce Clause are
recognized by the principle that "unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will
5

Id. at 156.

161d. at 157.
"Ild. at 158.
"Because of the large amounts of energy resources in tribal lands, the power to tax is significant.
The Council of Energy Resource Tribes has estimated that its member tribes own approximately
one-third of Western coal suitable for strip mining, forty percent of non-government owned uranium,
and four to five percent of onshore oil and gas resources.
89
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, d. 2.
90
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
91
L. Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw, § 5-20, p. 303 (1978).
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" 92
not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance ' This has
3
been called the "clear statement" principle? It is a real limit on congressional power
because it may be impossible to identify any clear legislative intent to an enactment.
The members of the majority voting for the law may have done so for differing
reasons, none of which may show on the record. However, if the legislative process
clearly indicates the intention of Congress to act under the Commerce Clause to
invalidate a state law, or to withdraw from the states and Indian tribes the right to act
"I f Congress
in certain areas, that intention will likely to be given effectby the courts.
94

wishes to utilize the full reach of its power, it need only say so:.

External limitations upon congressional action under the Commerce Clause are
those imposed by conflicting provisions of the Constitution, itself. Even here, the
courts will give deference to congressional determinations. An eiample is U.S. v.
Ptasynski,95 where it was argued that the Uniformity Clause, which says that excise
taxes must be "uniform throughout the United States "'96 invalidated the Windfall
Profit Tax? 7 The argument was that the act was unsupportable because it exempted
certain newly discovered Alaskan oil. "Distinctions based on geography are simply
not allowed "'98 a district judge had held. However, the Supreme Court held that
Congress may consider geographically isolated problems, though the courts will
examine such classifications closely to see if there is actual geographic
discrimination 99 Applying that test, the Court found the Windfall Profit Tax
constitutional because "exempt Alaskan oil" was subject to "disproportionate costs
00
and difficulties;' which justified its special treatment. It noted that "where ...
Congress has exercised its considered judgment with respect to an enormously
1
complex problem, we are reluctant to disturb its determination" '
10 2
to the Constitution
In appropriate circumstances, the Tenth Amendment
may be an important external limit to congressional power under the Commerce
Clause to control the levy of severance taxes. The purpose of the Tenth Amendment
is to preserve for the states some of the independence that they had enjoyed before
their entry into the Union. 10 3 The power of the states to tax has been consistently
recognized. "Matters of State taxation are reserved to the states under the tenth
amendment to the Constitution.. . . The power of the State legislature to levy and
0 4
collect taxes is unrestricted where such tax is not otherwise unconstitutional."'
Because of the importance of the right of the states to levy taxes, direct attempts
to limit state taxation of natural resources might be held improper under the Tenth
92

U.S. v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971).

13L. Tribe, supra note 91, at § 5-8, p. 243.
94

1d.

95
United
56

103 S. Ct. 2239 (1983).
States v. Ptasynski, - U.S. § 8, d. 1.
97
1.R.C. § 4986 (Supp. IV, 1980).
9
Ptasynski v. United States, 550 E Supp. 549, 553 (1982).
99
United States v. Ptasynski, supra note 95 at 2245.
10
01d.
U.S. CONsT. art. I,

"'Id. at 2246.
102
U.S. CONST.amend. X provides that "The powers not delegated to the United States by the

nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
Constitution,
103L. Tribe, supra note 91, § 5-20, p. 301.
' 04Snow v. Dixon, 66 Il. 2d 443, 362 N.E.2d 1052, 1062, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1977).
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Amendment. In NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery,'0 5 the Supreme Court upheld the
contention of several cities and states that the Tenth Amendment precluded federal
regulation under the Commerce Clause that extended federal minimum wage and
hour provisions to most of their public employees. It found that applying such
regulation to the states would "impermissibly interfere with the integral
governmental functions" of the states because it would so substantially affect the
states' allocation of funds and provision of services. 0 6 The Court suggested that any
federal action that "impairs the state's integrity" 0 7 requires "relinquishment of
important governmental activities;"' 0 8 "interferes with traditional aspects of state
sovereignty," 0 9 or imposes directly upon the states federal choices "as to how
essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral government functions are to be
made"11 0 would violate the Tenth Amendment.
This broad language was clarified in the companion cases of Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining and Reclamation Association,"'I and Hodel v. Indiana"' upholding the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977113 against assertions that it
robbed the states of the freedom to deal with restoration of strip mined lands within
their borders. In Hodel v. Indiana, the Court restated a premise of deference to
Congress, noting that:
[L]egislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life ... [have] a
presumption of constitutionality.... A court may invalidate legislation enacted under the
Commerce Clause only if itis clear that thereis no rational basis for a congressional finding
no reasonable
that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce, or that there is 114
connection between the regulatory means selected and the asserted ends.

In the Virginia Surface Mining case, the Court interpreted NationalLeagueof Cities as
setting a three-pronged testthat mustbe met if federal legislation is to be invalidated
by the courts:
First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates the 'States as States...
Second, the federal regulation must address matters that are indisputably 'attributes of
state sovereignty. . . And third, it must be apparent that the States' compliance with the
federal law would directly impair their ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of
" s
traditional functions.

Unless all three parts of the test are breached, the legislation is valid.
If this test were applied to federal legislation limiting severance taxes, the first
1 05

National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).

10

1d, at 851.

' 0 71d. at 843, (quoting Fry v. U.S., 421 U.S. 542, 547 n. 7).
'0 81d. at 847.
'0 9 Id. at 852.
0
"1
ld. at 855.
1"Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min.and Reclam. Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
112Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
1330 U.S.C. § 1201 (1979).
4
11 Hodel v. Indiana, supra note 112 at 323-24 (quoting Usery v.Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428
U.S. 1,5 15 (1978)).
" Hodel v. Virginia Surface & Min. Reclam. Ass'n., supra note 111 at 287-88.
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two parts of the disabling test would likely be met. Certainly legislation limiting levy
of severance taxes by the states affects the states as states. Likewise, the power to tax is
an attribute of state sovereignty and essential to their existence as separate entities.1 16
Only as to the third requirement, direct impairment of the states' ability to structure
integral operations, is there real doubt. A logical argument can be made that a
severe restriction on severance tax rates could "directly impair" state functions such
as conservation of natural resources and provision of services, at least in those states
in which severance taxes are an important component of state finances.
Determination of whether federal regulation under the Commerce clause
constitutes a forbidden impairment of the states' sovereignty calls for a balancing of
federal and state interests, ' 7 and the weight of the balance is not clear.
While the federal courts would be deferential to efforts of Congress to limit
severance tax rates, the cases in which the NationalLeague of Cities doctrine has been
held to have been satisifed are distinguishable. Establishment of a maximum
severance tax rate would be a more direct and severe limitation on the states than any
yet tested. In the VirginiaSurface Mining case,' 1 8federal legislation setting minimum
surface restoration provisions for the states was upheld. However, the states retained
the right to set higher standards and, indeed, did not have to address the issue at
all. n 9 InFERCv. Mississippi,20 provisions of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
of 1978 requiring that state public utility commissions "consider" specific rate
designs and regulatory standards and adopt regulations to achieve certain goals
were upheld. 12' However, the Court made a point of noting that nothing in the Act
required exercise of the states' sovereign powers or set standards that had to be
followed in all state regulation. 122 In contrast, the proposed severance tax legislation
would set a maximum rate rather than mere minimum standards. In addition,
severance taxes may be fiscally essential to some of the energy-rich states having no
other feasible way of raising needed revenues. Therefore, the disabling test of
NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery might be triggered by legislation limiting severance
123
tax rates.
An alternative to direct limitation upon the rate of severance taxes is indirect
limitation by forbidding the states to apply such taxes to resources from federal
lands within their borders. Since a large percentage of Western energy resources lie
1 16

Nathan v. Louisiana, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 73 (1850).
Hodel v. Virginia Surface & Min. Reclam. Ass'n., supra note 111 at 287-88.
"1ld. at 264.
119
91 Stat. 447, § 504.
1f the state does not act, a federal reclamation program is established for it.
12 0
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
,2'Tides I, III and Section 210 of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92
Stat. 3117 (1978), (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 2601 and 15 U.S.C. § 3201 (Supp. V 1981)).
122 FERC v. Mississippi, supra note 120 at 771.
' 23 As has been noted above, energy severance taxes provided 20 percent or more of state revenues
in eight states in 198 1. See the text at note 10. See also, Bradford, "Beyond Commonwealth Edison Co.
v. Montana: Direct Congressional Limitations on State Taxation of Natural Resources;' 9J. Corp. Tax,
253 (1982), and Wilson, "Severance Taxes, Energy Resources, and Blue-Eyed Arabs: 'Is the Power to
Tax the Power to Survive?"', 29 (Bureau of Governmental Research and Service, University of
Colorado, Boulder, July 1981). However, one commentator has concluded that imposition of a
12 percent ceiling "is unlikely to meet any serious constitutional challenges." Note, "Commerce
Clause Restraints on State Taxation of Energy Resources: A Suggested Framework for Analysis;' 60
Wash. U. L. Q. 425, 455 (1982).
1 17
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under federal lands, such a restriction would be a substantial limitation upon the
taxing power of the states.1 24 Presently, section 32 of the Mineral Lands Leasing
Act,12 5 expressly confers authority on the states to tax mining activities on federal
lands. It is not clear whether the states would have the power to tax private lessees
absent section 32. Congress was itself not sure in 1920 when it enacted the mineral
6
lands leasing legislation and for this reason included section 32.2 Both the
principle of federal sovereign immunity and plenary congressional authority under
support a federal law limiting the applicability
the Property Clause arguably would
12 7
of state taxes to federal lands.
Tenth Amendment restrictions may apply to federal limiting legislation also,
though such legislation would be based upon the federal government's powers
under the Property Clause1 28 and not the Commerce Clause. The NationalLeague of
Cities test has been applied by the Supreme Court only to legislation enacted under
the Commerce Clause, and federal power over federal lands has been termed
"without limitations" by the Court.129 However, the NationalLeague of Cities decision
explicitly reserved the issue of "whether different results might obtain if Congress
seeks to affect inttegral operations of state governments by exercising authority
granted it under other sections of the Constitution .". -,,30 and was specifically
discarded as inappropriate where the issue was Congress' power to enforce the
substantive provisions of the Civil War Amendments 31 One view is that National
League of Cities is based upon a concern that the states should not lose the autonomy
essential to their viability, rather than upon any special attribute of the Commerce
Clause.132 If so, its limits should apply to legislation enacted by Congress under the
Property Clause as well as the Commerce Clause.

1-4For example, 70-75% of Montana's coal lies under federal lands. Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
Montana, supra note 30 at 608-609.
12533 U.S.C. 189 (1971).
26
See 51 Cong. Rec. 14953, 14954-14955, 15039, 15055, 15060, 15064-15065, 15558-15559
53 Cong. Rec. 980-981 (1916); 58 Cong. Rec. 7770-7774 (1919).
(1914);
12 7See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 752-54 n.26 (1981), suggesting that Congress could
prohibit state taxes on natural resource mining on federal lands. For a full discussion of the extent of
the Property Clause power, see Gaetke, "Congressional Discretion Under the Property Clause" 33
HastingsL.J. 381 (1981) and Frank and Eckhard, "Power of Congress Under the Property clause to
Give Extraterritorial Effect to Federal Lands Law: Will 'Respecting Property' Go the Way of'Affecting
Commerce'?'" XV Nat. Res. Law 663 (1983).
128U.S. COxsT.art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, which provides: "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed so as to Prejudice any Claims of the
United States, or of any particular State."
12 9
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976).
" National League of Cities, supra note 105 at 852 n.17.
13 1
City of Rome v. U.S., 446 U.S. 156, 179-180 (1980).
132
Comment, "The Property Power, Federalism, and the Equal Footing Doctrine;' 80 Colum. L.
Rer: 817, 830 (1980). In addition it should be noted that the National League of Cities test could be
overruled or weakened by the Court. The argument has been made that NationalLeague of Cities "is
by Justice Stevens concurring in
inconsistent with the central purpose of the Constitution itself...
103 S.Ct. 1054, 1067 (1983).
U.S. -,
EEOC v. Wyoming, -
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2. CongressionalReticence to Act
Despite the suggestion in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana that Congress
could limit state severance taxes, Congress has been slow to act. Bills have been
introduced in the last three sessions of Congress to limit the maximum rate of
severance taxes to 12.5 percent 33 but no final action has been taken on any
proposal. Proponents have not been able to muster the political muscle for passage
of these direct limitations for a variety of reasons.
One reason Congress has failed to act has been uncertainty about the incidence
of severance taxes. Are they substantially exported from producing states to
consuming states? The assumption that they are exported is the rationale of limiting
legislation. However, the facts have not been clear.
The extent to which a given severance tax is actually exported from the levying
state to consumers depends upon the market dominance of the state imposing the
tax and the degree of inelasticity of the demand of the consuming public. Unless the
producing state has a large share of the productive capacity of the resource,
competition from other producing states will force the resource's local extractors to
absorb the tax. 134 If consumers have readily-available alternative sources of the
commodity, if they can substitute another resource for it (as large energy users
frequently do), or if they can do without it altogether, then the tax cannot be
exported.
Market dominance and demand elasticity may be determined by legal
institutions, as well as by the laws of supply and demand. Environmental restraints
upon sulphur emissions may give states with deposits of low sulphur coal market
dominance. 3 5 Long term contracts with "pass through" provisions for variable costs
such as severance taxes may make demand for the resource more inelastic. 36
There is no general agreement among economists as to whether the incidence
of severance taxes is exported. It has been argued that no state has the market
38
dominance necessary, 37 and that a cartel of producing states would not be stable.
1 33

S. 463, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. S 1073-75 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1983); H.R. Res. 2690,

98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. H2313, E1803-04 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1983).
134To the extent that local extractors have out of state stockholders, an absorbed tax may be
exported.
effectively
135Approximately 86% of the low sulphur coal reserves of the U.S. are located west of the
Mississippi River. P. Hamilton, The Reserve Base of U.S. Coals on Sulphur Content - The Western States, 2
(U.S. Bureau of Mine Circular 8693, 1975). Montana and Wyoming control 68% of U.S. low sulphur
coal reserves and, in fact, that coal is in high demand because of the environmental restraints of
legislation such as the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, § 102(a)(2),
92 Stat. 3298. See H.R. Rep. No. 1527, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1980), quoted by J. Blackmun,
dissenting in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra note 30 at 638. According to another
source, Montana alone has 40% of low sulphur coal reserves. "Fiscal Disparities: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs" 97th
Cong.,36 1st Sess. 9 (1981) (Testimony of William P. Rogers).
1 Allegedly, 90% of coal mined in Montana was sold to purchasers in other states under long term
contracts with "pass through" provisions. H.R. Rep. No. 1527, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 3-4 (1980) quoted
at 453
U.S. at 639.
13 7
McLure, "Severance Taxes on Energy Resources in the United States: Comment' 10 Growth and
Change
72, 72-73 (1979).
13
SShelton and Morgan, "Resource Taxation, Tax Exportation and Regional Energy Policies" 17
Nat. ResourcesJ. 261, 282 (1977).
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On the other hand, others have concluded that a substantial portion of the incidence
of severance taxes is exported.1 9 Both groups have been cautious in their
conclusions, however.1 40 A neutral observer has noted:
One must be cautious in interpreting the results of existing interstate tax exportation
studies. The incidence assumptions for many business taxes remain a subject of debate, the
and the treatment of the
data for allocating tax payments by residents must be improved,
14
Federal offset has a substantial effect on the estimates.4

The scenario is clouded further by the likelihood that market conditions will not be
stable, so that the incidence of taxes may be exported at one time but absorbed at
another.
A second reason for congressional inaction is disagreement over whether
export of severance taxes, if it occurs, would be unfair. To the extent that severance
taxes are necessary to compensate the levying state for damage to its environment
and for the costs of developing and supporting the infrastructure required to
support the extraction of the resource, then even if taxes are exported to ultimate
consumers, they are not unfair. Those who reap the benefits of the energy should
pay its real costs. Despite derision from consumer states, the producing states have
argued forcefully that this is the case:
While a 30 percent tax of any sort may seem excessive at first, a more careful analysis
suggests that projected revenue in the energy-producing states will just about balance out
water, health
with needed increases in public outlays for education, public safety, roads,
142
care and land reclamation associated with rapid energy development.

The facts may differ from state to state. North Dakota, for example, may have actual
costs associated with mining and use of its coal to generate electricity which is
exported that exceed 12 percent, while Montana mightbe able to recoup all of her
43
costs by other existing levies.'
Likewise, to the extent that energy severance taxes exported by the producing
states are offset by other taxes that are imported, the severance taxes are not unfair.
It is inevitable that there will be economic "give and take" among the states in our
13 9See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 509-514 (2d Ed. 1977), and Shelton & Vogt, "The
Incidence of Coal Severance Taxes: Political Perceptions and Economic Realities;' 22 Nat. Res.J. 539,
557 (1982). But see Hellerstein, "Constitutional Constraints on State and Local Taxation of Energy
Resources:' 31 Nat. Tax. J. 245, 248-49 (1978); McLure, "Economic Constraints on State and Local
Taxation of Energy Resources:' 31 Nat. TaxJ. 256, 159 (1978); Gillis, "Severance Taxes and Energy
Resources in the United States: A Tale of Two Minerals:' 10 Growth and Change 55, 63 (1979); and
McLure, supra note 137 at 72.
140For example, two economists conclude that 29 percent to 40 percent of coal severance taxes are
passed through to consumers, with the percentage of western taxes shifted to midwestern consumers
even higher, but note that "a conservative estimate of two standard deviations yields a plus or minus
10% range" of error. Shelton and Vogt, "The Incidence of Coal Severance Taxes: Political Perceptions
and Economic Realities:' 22 Nat. ResourcesJ. 539, 555 (1982).
' 4 t Parker,supra note 17at 19.Seealso, Miernyk, 1J. ofEnergyandDevelopmentsupranote 3at321.
42Southern States Energy Board, State Severance Taxes: The GrowingDebateover RegionalDifferences
3 (Dec. 1981).
143See the discussion at Note, "Commerce Clause Restraints on State Taxation of Energy
Resources: ASuggested Framework for Analysis:' 60 Wash. U.L.Q. 425,456 notes 177 and 178 (1982).
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federal union. In this respect, it is interesting to note that one of the studies on tax
exportation reveals that the highest net tax export rates belong to Delaware and
44
Nevada, neither of which are primarily reliant upon energy severance taxesj
Again, the energy-producing states have made the argument forcefully:
To single out severance taxes on energy and to attempt to limit that particular tax overlooks
many other taxes imposed by states on avast range of commodities and services, all of which
are exported to some extent to the consumers of other states. Should Michigan's power to
impose a tax on an automobile manufactured in that state also be limited? Should we
on the New York
continue to allow New York to impose a transfer tax on each transaction
45
Stock Exchange regardless of the stockholder's state of residence?

The basic problem is that severance taxes cannot be analyzed in isolation. They are
only one of a "crazy quilt" scheme of local, state, and federal taxes and subsidies,
whose basis and impact are often hard to discern.
A third reason for congressional inaction on legislation to limit severance taxes
is that, despite the recent increase in their relative importance, they are still small
items in the big picture of government finance and economic activity. The Montana
coal tax was a political cause celebre, but it raised only about $70 million in fiscal
1981.146 Total collections in all states from severance taxes were less than $6.5 billion
that year.' 47 That amounted to only 4.3 percent of total tax collections of state
governments in 198 1.14 In addition, although the rates of some severance taxes are
high, their impact has not been severely felt by most consumers because they have
been lost amid other inflationary pressures and because the price of the resource at
the wellhead or mine is often a relatively small component of its price to the
coal
consumer; e.g., it has been asserted that the 30% Montana severance tax1 on
49
adds two percent to the annual electricity bills of Midwestern consumers.
Fourth, while Congress waited for the courts to decide the Constitutional issues
of Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, it enacted a variety of direct and indirect
subsidies that more than offset the impact of whatever portion of energy severance
taxes are exported from producing states to consuming states. A subsidy is the
opposite of a tax. To the extent that energy usage is subsidized, the subsidy negates
taxes paid on the energy used. With subsidies, the federal government can make
redistribution of income that offset (or emphasize) sectionalist taxes. At least three
kinds of energy subsidies were contained in legislation enacted in the late 1970's and
early 1980's: (1) transfer payments from producers to consumers; (2) incentives to
develop existing energy resources, and (3) subsidies to promote development and
use of new energy resources, including conservation.
114C. Phaares, Who Pays State and Local Taxes? (Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain Publishers, Inc.,
Cambridge, Mass. 1980). Table 4-5.
5
' 4 Southern States Energy Board, supra note 142 at 2. To some extent, this reasoning begs the
question. There is a fundamental issue of fairness raised where citizens of one state are subject to the
political externality of taxes imposed by another state without direct representation of their interests.
a circumstance is inherent in a federal system does not make it fair.
That such
146Staff Study, supra note 7 at 3-11.
1'4 U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of The Census, "State Government Tax Collections in 1981;'
Table 43, p. 7 (GF81 No 1).
' sStaff Study, supra note 7 at 3-7.
"19"Fiscal Disparities: Hearings;' supra note 135 at 72. (Testimony of Senator John Melcher).
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Direct subsidies to energy consumers during the period in question included
block grants to the states for payment of utility bills and weatherization of the
residences of low income persons, 50 and energy tax credits for home owners'
investments in conservation and renewable energy sources' 5 1 Indirect subsidies
included a partial shelter for consumers from higher natural gas prices by
provisions in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 intended to shift the brunt of higher
well-head prices to industrial users, 152 and an $88 billion program for development
53
of a synthetic fuels industry. '
By far the most important of the legislation subsidizing energy consumers was
the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980.154 The Windfall Profit Tax, which
accompanied deregulation of oil prices,' 55 may be seen as a national severance tax
transferring huge economic rents from oil producers to the coffers of the federal
government 56 It is an indirect subsidy to energy consumers in that, without it, their
taxes would have to be higher to support the present level of government services.
When it was enacted, it was estimated that it would raise a total of $228 billion by
1990.157 The trend of actual collections suggests that the total will be substantially
15
Such programs were authorized by the Headstart, Economic Opportunity, and Community
Partnership Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-644, 88 Stat. 2291, 2308 (1975), repealedby Pub. L. No. 97-35
§ 683(a), 95 Stat. 519 (1981). A thorough analysis of their funding and operation is included in
Manaster, "Energy Equity for the Poor: The Search for Fairness in Federal Energy Assistance Policy;' 7
Harv. Env. L. Rev. 371, 375-402 (1983).
' 51Energy Tax Actof 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174, Title I, § 101 (codified as 26 U.S.C.
44C. (Supp 11 1978).
11215 U.S.C. § 201 (Supp V. 1981).
153
Energy Security Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611, Title I (codified as 42 U.S.C.
§§ 8701-8795
(Supp. V 1981)).
154
Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (1980).
55
With the OPEC-mandated increases that took the price of oil from about $2.50 to nearly $40.00
per barrel in less than 10 years there camea public outcry that the oil industry's "unearned" rents ought
to be shared. Initially, price controls were imposed on oil. See 6 C.F.R., Part 150, Subpart L (1973).
Then, President Carter made a decision to decontrol the price of oil, but recommended a Windfall
Profit Tax. For a discussion of the background and working of the tax see Oosterhuis, "The Crude Oil
Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980:' 39th Inst. on Fed. Tax Ch. 42 (Matthew Bender, 1981).
'5 6This is a gross oversimplification of the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act, of course. The Act
was much more than an excise tax. In addition, it included the Home Energy Assistance Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (1980), which provided for a Low Income Energy Assistance Trust
Fund and authorized appropriations of $3.115 billion for fiscal year 1981. The Fund was to provide
cash payments for energy costs tolow income families. Half of the available funding was to be allocated
among the states in proportion to the total costs of energy usage. The other half was to be allocated on
the basis of the average annual number of heating degree days for each state multiplied by the number
of low income households in the state. This formula favored the energy consuming states, which tend
to be located in colder areasand to have larger numbers of low income households. In the final analysis,
however, funding of only $1.85 billion was appropriated for 198 1, and the program was subsequently
substantially modified and divorced from the Windfall Profit Tax. See Manaster, supra note 150. The
Act also included substantial subsidies for the development of alternative energy sources. It increased
the rates of tax credits permitted for solar, wind, and geothermal energy equipment and extended the
availability of tax credits to hydroelectric generating property, cogenerating equipment, petroleum
coke and pitch plants, coke and coke gas equipment, intercity buses, and biomass techniques. It
extended the gasohol exemption from the federal excise tax on motor fuels and permitted a credit for
alcohol used as a fuel. It expanded the definitions of solid-waste disposal facilities and hydroelectric
generating facilities as renewable energy property eiitiled to issue tax exempt industrial bonds.
iIH.R. Rep. No. 817, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 163, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
714 (Appendix, Budget Effects).
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less, largely because of lower oil prices than had been anticipated. 58 Nonetheless,
the sheer magnitude of the income transfer from oil producers has done much to
eclipse the severance tax "export!' issue.159
Fifth, though Congress did not act directly to limit the rates on state and Indian
severance taxes, itplaced indirect limits upon taxes of oil, the most important of the
energy resources. n" One of the issues that confronted Congress in framing the
Windfall Profits Tax was whether severance taxes on oil should be deductible from
the sale price in calculating the tax. Deduction seemed justified because, to the
extent that sales proceeds are paid over to the state in severance taxes, there is no
"profit" to the producer upon which a tax can be levied. On the other hand, to
permit unlimited deductions would be to invite the states to increase severance taxes
and short-circuit the Windfall Profit Tax by transferring revenues from the federal
government to the producing states. As a result, the Act provided that there could be
6
no severance tax deduction to the extent that the total rate exceeded 15 percent.' '
The Windfall Profit Tax Act contains an even stricter provision affecting Indian
severance taxes. Indian severance levies are not deductible from the sales price in
calculating windfall profits. 62 The effect of these provisions is to put a "cap" on the
rate of state severance taxes on oil, and to provide a strong disincentive to the
enactment of Indian severance taxes on oil. Severance taxes in excess of the limits
will come out of producers' pockets and be a substantial detriment to continued
63
activity within the state or on the reservation.a
15 8The table that follows contrasts the estimates of receipts from the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax
anticipated when the Act was passed with actual receipts:

FY

(In Millions of Dollars)
1983
1982

1984

1980

1981

Conference Committee
Estimate ................

3,172

13,436

19,543

19,958

21,144

Actual .................

5,959

23,290

18,881

14,264 (est.)

12,288 (est.)

Sources: Executive Office of the President Office of Management and Budget, "Budget of the United
States Government Fiscal Year 1984, 1983, 1982 (Government Printing Office), and
H.R. Rep. No. 817 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 166. Reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong., & Ad. News 717
l(Table 2).
159
0f course, not all federal subsidies enacted in recent years have been to energy consumers.
Approximately $103,000,000 per year has been paid since 1976 pursuant to 31 Stat. § 6901 et. seq. to
local governments in which federally-owned lands are located under an entitlements program
intended to compensate local government units for tax revenues that they would receive if the land
were privately owned. Sources: Executive Office of the President Office of Management and Budget,
"Budget of the United States Government;' Fiscal Year 1985, 1984, 1983, 1982, 1981, 1980, 1979,
(Government Printing Office).
1600il accounts for approximately 55% of the value of non-renewable energy production in the
United
States.
61
.R.C. §§ 4988(a)(2) and 4996(c)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1981). The Act also defined severance taxes to
exclude unit taxes; only ad valorem taxes, those determined on the basis of the gross value of the
extracted
oil will qualify. See § 4996(c)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
16 2
1.R.C. § 4996(c)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
16
Of course, severance taxes paid are still deductible from gross income to reach adjusted gross
income for federal income tax purposes, as is Windfall Profit Tax paid. However, the producer's total
tax bill is minimized if he can deduct severance taxes in calculating Windfall Profit Tax.
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Finally, and perhaps most important, the economic pendulum has swung and
largely eliminated for the present the economic advantages of the energy producing
states that underlie the sectionalist conflict. The combination of lower prices for
oil 16 4 caused b, OPEC's inability to maintain price levels, deep recession and
conservation made it apparent that the energy industry was grossly overcapitalized.
The resulting shake-out has staggered the economies of the energy producing
states. Major regional financial institutions that had encouraged frenetic
development based on inflated estimates of demand and prices have been hard hit,
and some have failed' 65 Literally thousands of independent producers have gone
bankrupt or sold their properties at bargain prices. Even large oil companies and
pipelines have not been immune. A wave of mergers swallowed up relative giants
such as Gulf, Cities Service, Getty and Superior. 66 The plight of many pipelines is1so
67
dire that fundamental reorganization of the industry is under consideration.
These developments have left the major energy producing states with budget
deficits, increased unemployment, and the prospect of more of the same 168 at the
same time that the energy consuming states have been rebounding from the
recession. 69 They have made it unnecessary and impolitic for Congress to enact
severance tax limits.
In short, congressional action appears less and less likely. With the passage of
time the higher rates of severance tax have become "normal" like the high energy
prices that motivated them. Consumers and their representatives in Congress have
other energy-related problems with which to contend, notably the issue of
deregulation of natural gas prices. Economic changes have made sseverance tax
limits unnecessary and impolitic. The life span of political issues is only as long as the
period between crises, and the crisis is past for the moment.
E.

Conclusion: The FederalSystem Vindicated?

-It should not be concluded that, because neither the courts nor Congress have
acted to place a limit on the rate of state and tribal severance taxes, the legal system
has failed to cope with the problem. What the challenges to energy severance taxes
in Commonwealth Edison v. Montana and Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe and the
164

From June 1980 through January 1981 OPEC's official price was $37.00 per barrel. See,
Knaverhase, "Saudi Arabian Oil Policies:' Current History, p. 29 (Jan. 1984). However, spot market
prices, i.e., non-contract prices negotiated according to the supply of and demand for oil, soared as
high as $40 per barrel. See Monthly Energy Review, February 1984 (DOE/EIA-0035) (84102) for FOB
cost of crude oil imports from 1976 through February 1984. The current official OPEC price is $29.50
per barrel. Further price reductions announced by Great Britain and Nigeria in October, 1984,
threaten maintenance of the official price.
165
First National Bank of Midland, Texas became the nation's second largest bank failure on
October 14, 1983. The Penn Square Bank of Oklahoma City also failed in the summer of 1983. See
6 4 65
9
Business Week, October 31, 1983 at4 . See U.S. News & World Report,January 30, 1984, pp. - .
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation had to step in to save Continental Illinois Bank in the
summer of 1984.
66
See, Wall Street Journal, March 7, 1984, at 22, col. 1, at 23, col. 4.
16 7See, Pierce, "Reconsidering the Role of Regulation and Competition in the Natural Gas
Industry:' 97 Harvard L. Rev. 345 (1983) (advocating deregulation of natural gas pipeline companies).
16
S5ee U.S. News & World Report, December 5, 1983, p. 12.
'6aSee U.S. News & World Report, January 30, 1984, pp. 64-65.
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attempts to get Congress to pass limiting legislation did accomplish was to "buy time"
for reflection of the issues involved and for fundamental economic forces to work.
The threat of action by the courts and Congress no doubt caused the energy
producing states to hesitate to follow Montana's lead in raising severance taxes to
high levels. With the passage of time has come changed economic conditions that
have made it more difficult for the producing states to export severance taxes to the
consuming states and impolitic to further burden their own energy extractive
industries. 170 While several states and Indian tribes have increased or levied
severance taxes since 1975, only Wyoming and North Dakota have approached the
level of Montana's tax on coal.1 7 ' In fact, the 12.5 percent "cap" sought in the most
popular bill to limit severance taxes apparently would72 presently affect only
Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, and perhaps Kansas.1
In short, one cannot forget that the legal system in the United States is a part of
a broader, federal political system. Like the policeman on the beat, the role of the
federal courts and Congress in disputes between the states is as much to deter
anti-social behavior as to intervene to impose order. One function of the legal,
administrative and legislative processes is to give the disputants time to reconsider
their positions and compromise their goals, to reflect upon their long-term interests,
and to consider the wisdom of avoiding a clear-cut determination of winners and
losers. In the context of energy severance taxes, these processes have permitted the
dispute to be put into the larger perspective that only time and operation of the
economic system can give. Although neither the federal courts nor Congress have
been willing to act directly to arbitrate the sectional conflict over energy severance
taxes, the power of these legal institutions to act has played an important part in
permitting economic forces to adjust, albeit it painfully, the energy severance tax
controversy. While the Montana and Jicarilla Apache taxes remain in place, their
impact upon consumers is minimal and other states have not followed suit. Montana
and the Apache Tribe are isolated, their economies staggered by high
unemployment and low growth caused in part by the unwise exercise of their
sovereign authority to tax.' 73 The system has worked to permit time and changed
circumstances to defuse the energy severance tax controversy.
'70 Dr. Henry Steel, Professor of Economics at the University of Houston, has argued that current
market conditions would bar the export of Texas severance tax increases. "The peoplein the East don't
pay any more for their oil despite severance tax increases because the producers can't shift their prices
above the OPEC ceiling:' Houston Post, Sunday, Feb. 26, 1984, p. 13E.
17'Wyoming applies an effective severance tax rate of 17 percent to coal. "Fiscal Disparities,
Hearings,"supra note 135 at 17. Testimony of William P. Rogers. North Dakota levies a tax estimated at
20% of value. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra note 30 at 640, n. 5, and Ch. 57-61
North7 2Dak. Cent. Code.
1 Kansas levies a net severance tax of approximately 4.33 percent on oil and 7 percent on gas. S.B.
452, 1983 Sess. Laws of Kan., effective May 1, 1983. In addition, however, producing properties are
subject to a county ad valorem tax on personal property measured by gross value, that has been treated
by FERC as a severance tax. The total of the two taxes probably exceeds 15 percent in some counties.
"3Arizona, home of the Jicarilla tribe, and Montana ranked 32nd and 37th respectively in per
capita income growth in 1983 according to a recent Commerce Department report. Other
energy-producing states had equally dismal rankings, with the exception of Alaska which had the
highest per capita income growth in the country. See Tulsa World, August 29, 1984, B-2. Similarly,
energy-producing states in general still have higher unemployment rates than non-producing states.
See U.S. Department of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, July 1984, pp. 142-146.
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It is quite likely that state severance taxes will become a sectionalist issue
sometime again in the future, for energy sectionalism is little more than a
manifestation of the inherent tendency of human beings to take advantage of their
neighbors (whom they may not trust anyway) when circumstances permit them to
do so. 174 However Commonwealth Edison v. Montana,Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe,
and the response of Congress to the phenomena that caused those cases should give
confidence that the system will once more weather the storm. The constitutional
powers of the federal courts and Congress are sufficient to protect one group of
states from economically predatory actions of other groups, if the courts or
Congress choose to exercise them. That those powers exist makes the need for their
exercise less likely.

74

See B. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 176-177 (Yale 1980) and J. Dukemisier & J.
Krier, Property 55, N.19 (Little, Brown 1981), for a discussion of the "Free Rider" or "Hold Out"
principle of economics.
1

